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How did Hitler Fool Stalin so Badly with the Invasion of the USSR? | WW2 Brain Bucket Reader Q&A
Today we look at how Hitler duped Stalin by invading the Soviet Union, Hirohito’s Allied post-war makeover, Axis POWs in the US, UK & more!
Q: A few nights ago I was out to dinner with my girlfriend’s family, and her Dad is also a WWII history fanboy. At some point me and him started talking about the worst American and English generals during the war. Basically sitting there beating up on Mark Clark (her Dad is from Texas) and lackluster Archie Wavell. Afterward I thought, who was the most underrated leader for England and America? – Alex, Toronto Canada
Talk about a loaded question; there are definitely many qualified candidates. However, if I am being fair, two nominees stand out: British Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS) Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke and US Army Chief of Staff George Marshall.
To veteran scholars of the war these two figures are legendary. Yet outside academia, the general population’s knowledge of the war rarely acknowledges either man existed, despite their crucial and high profile roles throughout the conflict.
Wikicommons From left to right: American General George C. Marshall & Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke
Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke
The then General Alan Brooke (Brooke became Lord Alanbrooke in 1944 after receiving his first peerage) was appointed by Churchill in late 1941 to serve as CIGS. As CIGS, Alanbrooke was the most senior military leader in Britain, assuming a position analogous to the current post of US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Prior to that appointment Alanbrooke lead the UK’s Home Command. In this post he commanded the British troops stationed around the British Isles who were readying to repel a possible looming German invasion. When Alanbrooke was promoted to CIGS in 1941, it inaugurated one of the most extraordinary collaborations in military planning during the war.
Alanbrooke personally wasn’t always the easiest man to know. He was a paragon of military professionalism, but outside his role professionally as a major war leader, Alanbrooke seldom welcomed the outside world past his front door. He was hardly a cool and distant figure, but he chose to open up personally to a comparatively few people. His work and his personal life intersected little. Regardless of any introverted inclination he may have possessed personally, Alanbrooke was a singular fit in the business of war planning.
Alanbrooke’s mind was akin to a steel trap. His intellect was composed of stellar analytical insight, coupled with a strong practical sense for leading people. Alanbrooke was cemented with an iron constitution that invariably lead him to speak his mind and stand his ground when he thought he was right. General Douglas MacArthur, a man who was hardly known for effusive praise of others, considered Alanbrooke the greatest British soldier since the Duke of Wellington. Talk about praise from the American Caesar.
As CIGS, these qualities proved altogether necessary in his working relationship with Churchill. The relationship between these two men, while epic, was not always rainbows and sunshine. How do historians know that, you ask? It certainly wasn’t sourced from Churchill’s famous wartime memoirs. Rather, throughout the war, Alanbrooke became an unintentional man of letters.
The Alanbrooke War Diaries
In what has become an invaluable historical record, Alanbrooke kept a daily diary throughout the war, despite the practice of doing so being officially banned. His diaries, first published in 1957 in abridged format (removing any reference to information still deemed secret by HMG), present an exceptionally well written contemporary account of historical events. Alanbrooke’s entries begin at the outbreak of war itself in 1939 when Alanbrooke was stationed in France commanding the BEF II Corps, and follow consistently to the conflict’s end in 1945 when serving as Britain’s top solider.
Alanbrooke’s recollections, specifically while serving at the highest echelons of Allied command, are priceless. Alanbrooke would return home each night and dictate entries to his wife Benita. Alanbrooke did not compile his diary with an eye toward posterity; he was using his diary as a venting mechanism to alleviate personal stress and frustration. His diary was a wartime vice that, comparatively, was far less self-destructive than those indulged by others who also held the weight of his people’s continued existence on their shoulders.
Alanbrooke paints a unique inside picture of British and Allied decision making during the war, one that coupled his precise observations and often venomous prose. Without ever believing his words would be read by anyone other than himself, Alanbrooke never held back his thoughts and feelings. For historians, there are few items that can have greater value.
Alanbrooke & Churchill: A Study in Creative-Combustibles
In their 3 years long professional relationship, Alanbrooke and Churchill’s rows could be astounding. Winston Churchill was a force of nature in his work and his intransigence is well documented. Anyone working with Churchill under those circumstances must have the mettle to manage it. Alanbrooke as a “stiff necked Ulsterman” in Churchill’s words, proved the ideal match for the British PM.
Churchill and Alanbrooke’s working relationship, with all its inherent friction, has been described as encompassing creative tension. Perhaps, more precisely, they constituted a creative-combustable. Whatever of the frustration and friction each generated toward each other, it was a winning combination.
Churchill only valued and respected people who told him exactly what they thought and was dismissive toward those who told him what they thought he wanted to hear. To that end Alanbrooke was invaluable, as he never wavered to deliver on this all important quality. Despite the combative nature their work together would elicit, both men were explicit in their adoration and respect for each other.
General George C. Marshall
General George C. Marshall was not altogether dissimilar to Alanbrooke in his approach on the American side. President Roosevelt appointed Marshall as his Army Chief of Staff on 1 September, 1939 – the start of the war in Europe. As Army Chief of Staff, Marshall was America’s top soldier and the highest ranking military aide to FDR throughout the war.
Marshall was quite singular in many respects. His view of the role for a professional soldier permeated the entirety of his character and influenced the model for American military professionalism that extends to this day. Marshall was unwavering in his speaking truth to power, and actively maintained the requisite objectivity to successfully do so.
Speaking Truth to Power
When Marshall was offered the Army Chief of Staff post by FDR, Marshall stipulated to the President that he would only accept the role if he had the inviolable right to say exactly what he thought, with the understanding that sometimes it may prove displeasing. Marshall possessed the unique ability, like Alanbrooke, to speak truth to power. Marshall doing so was critical to US decision making during the war. Moreover, Marshall sought to create the best personal objectivity to operate with unbiased clarity.
It is said that Marshall valued his professional objectivity to such a degree that he did not even vote in elections, so as not to influence his judgement. If that weren’t enough, Marshall did not let the President call him “George.” In the professional realm, no one was granted the privilege to call him by his first name.
Even though Marshall eschewed politics personally, he clearly understood politics. The position of Army Chief of Staff dictated he play politics in pursuit of the highest goal: preparing for, and winning the war. In total, Marshall generated a reputation for his bipartisan approach.
Marshall’s widely regarded reputation for objectivity put Marshall in a unique position, in that he was held in the greatest esteem by both political parties. Marshall’s bipartisan reputation greatly aided in dealing with a strongly isolationist pre-war lobby in Congress who were making any war preparation extremely difficult prior to America’s entry into the war. This was where Marshall made his greatest career legacy.
“The Organizer of Victory” – Churchill in Reference to George Marshall
Marshall’s role in rebuilding the US military prior to Americans entry in the conflict was monumental. Upon Marshall’s appointment in 1939, the US Army had roughly 100,000 in its ranks. By the standards of militaries at the time, the US’s was very small – roughly equal to the size of Romania’s army. By the war’s end in 1945, 16 million Americans would have worn the uniform. Marshall’s role proved nothing less than being the ultimate “organizer of victory” for the United States.
In the popular historical imagination, most people envision the United States entering the war as the fully realized “Arsenal of Democracy,” and one of the two most formidable military forces on earth. That belief could not be further from the truth. In reality, a massive effort was required for the country to reach full mobilization militarily and industrially.
Throughout his 43 years in the Army, Marshall became well regarded for his organizational skills and working with people. While Marshall never lead troops in combat, he instead was a formidable staff officer. While serving in France during the First World War, Marshall showcased his military planning potential as the Aide-de-Camp to the Commander of the American Expeditionary Force (AEF), General John J. Pershing. Marshall’s duty in France served him well in preparation for the greatest crucible he would face more than two decades later.
George Marshall and his Contemporaries
When seeking to understand historical events and figures within the context they lived and occurred, nothing is more important than contemporanious accounts and perspective. In using that measure to understand Marshall, one cannot possibly overlook the overwhelming esteem Marshall’s colleagues held for him.
Dean Acheson, Marshall’s successor as President Truman’s Secretary of State, was notorious for the harsh measure by which he viewed others. Acheson described Marshall thusly:
“…the combination of Marshall’s character, sagacity, capacious mind and selfless service brooked only one comparison in American history (George Washington).”
In Acheson’s world, praise of that nature was reserved for a canonized few. Simply put, there was no figure in American government who eclipsed George C. Marshall.
George C. Marshall and Alanbrooke: Planning the Perilous Path to Victory in the West
What is very interesting is the relationship between Marshall, Alanbrooke, FDR and Churchill which represented the highest level of Allied decision making during the war. While this aforementioned quartet was definitely successful, their collaboration had clear conflicts on the road to Allied victory.
Make no mistake about it, the US and British Empire were far from being in lock-step when it came to the grand strategy of fighting the war. It is undeniable that the two nations’ cooperation during the war was an unprecedented example of coalition warfare. The integration of both nations’ military structure proved both highly effective but not without difficulties. The US and Britain had differing histories, national political interests, and ways of war. From a military professional perspective, it was Marshall and Alanbrooke working together directly to hybridize the best joint policies to ensure Allied victory.
Marshall and Alanbrooke mostly worked very well together, but each had highly contrasting views of how to best win the war. This is most poignant when planning the so-called “second front,” a major amphibious invasion of northern France designed to draw off German divisions fighting on the brutal Eastern Front against the Soviet Union. The invasion that became best known as D-Day.
The wrangling over a western second front began in June 1941, following Operation Barbarossa – the German invasion of the USSR. However, for a variety of reasons, such an assault was not possible for another three years.
When the US entered the war, it was their desire to mount cross-channel operations – later dubbed D-Day – as soon as practicable. US military planners presented two such plans for 1942. The British view was far more ambivalent about this prospect and their divergent belief was a point of major strategic contention for these allies. Marshall and Alanbrooke, as each countries top military representatives, were at the eye of that storm.
After Marshall and Alanbrooke’s first official meeting when the 1942 invasion plan was presented, Alanbrooke later wrote in his diary that Marshall was building “castles in the air,” believing neither country were anywhere close to ready. Alanbrooke was quite right at that juncture, the prerequisites to successfully invade northern Europe did not yet exist. Furthermore, the British were haunted by their horrific experiences fighting the German Army on the Western Front three decades prior. As well as their most recent experience culminating in the Dunkirk evacuation of 1940.
For Marshall’s part, he became exasperated with how the British desired to fight the war. With the campaigns in North Africa, Sicily and Italy, Marshall saw the fight in the Mediterranean as a suction pump for resources. Marshall viewed the Mediterranean as a diversionary theater of war that could not in and of itself achieve victory over Germany. For the Allies to defeat Germany by route of southern Italy to Berlin, it has been compared to invading the US from Houston, with the aim to conquer DC by way of the Appalachian mountains.
Marshall therefore never ceased the pressure to launch D-Day, as it was the only real way to ultimately exterminate Nazism.
The issue of the second front very much defined Marshall and Alanbrooke’s relationship. Even for all the difficulties that task entailed, both men represented their respective powers and managed their political masters with consummate professionalism and skill. Nor did their both being promised command of Operation Overlord (D-Day), while fatefully being passed over for the post in favor of Eisenhower, did either ever blink in executing their paramount roles.
Marshall and Alanbrooke were unflinching in their approach speaking truth to power and proved an effective tandem as architects for the Western Allies’ war effort. It is a sad truth that with their respective tremendous impact toward victory, both are almost absent from the popular memory of the war. It is a criminal disservice to both as each served critical – nay irreplaceable – roles in this grand historical narrative.
Recommended Reading:
- “Masters and Commanders: How Four Titans Won the War in the West, 1941-1945” by Andrew Roberts
- “War Diaries, 1939-1945: Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke” by Field Marshal 1st Viscount Alanbrooke, Edited by Alex Danchev
- “Alanbrooke” by Sir David Fraser
- “The Generals: American Military Command from World War II to Today” by Thomas E. Ricks
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